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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States should drop all criminal charges against 
Zacarias Moussaoui,1 not because he is innocent, but because he is 
a foreign citizen who is (or was) a terrorist bent on killing innocent 
 
       †   Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.  Prior to 
joining the legal academy, Professor Radsan had extensive experience as a federal 
prosecutor and as Assistant General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency.  
Professor Radsan thanks Greg Eich and Dan Moak for their tireless and excellent 
research assistance on this article.  He also thanks Professor Wayne Logan from 
William Mitchell College of Law and Professor Robert Chesney from Wake Forest 
University School of Law for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this 
article. 
 1. Zacarias Moussaoui, the infamous “20th Hijacker,” was arrested in 
Minnesota in August 2001.  NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON 
THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 247 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 REPORT], 
available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.  He is 
currently the only defendant facing trial for the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
1
Radsan: The Moussaoui Case: The Mess from Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
RADSAN (REVISED) 4/25/2005  1:15:51 PM 
1418 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
Americans, destroying American property, and disrupting 
American society.2  For less than a nanosecond, Moussaoui should 
be a free man again.  Once the federal criminal charges against 
him are dropped, Moussaoui’s publicly paid lawyers, including the 
Federal Defenders of the Eastern District of Virginia, should be 
released from their services.  Those who are broad-minded might 
thank the defense lawyers for doing their best—despite 
Moussaoui’s antics—to defend him.  Those who offer such thanks 
do so based on a presumption of innocence, and on a criminal 
process that strives to give a fair trial to even those accused of the 
most despicable crimes.3  But these presumptions and assumptions 
are the faith of the criminal realm.  To apply them to the military 
or intelligence realm may be heresy, folly, madness, or worse. 
Before the nanosecond of Moussaoui’s freedom ends, he 
should be transferred to the custody of the United States 
Department of Defense.4  After that, based on recommendations 
coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC) for the 
President, the Executive Branch should implement a well-
conceived decision about Moussaoui’s next address.  The NSC, 
rather than a particular United States agency, such as the Justice 
Department or the Defense Department, is the appropriate forum 
to vet such policies because they transcend the boundaries between 
domestic and international spheres, going beyond law enforcement 
and military issues.  The NSC, which sits above the various agencies 
in a coordinating role, was, after all, created in 1947 “to advise the 
President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and 
 
 2. The most recent charges against Moussaoui, through superseding 
indictment, are:  (1) conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending national 
boundaries, (2) conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, (3) conspiracy to destroy an 
aircraft, (4) conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, (5) conspiracy to 
murder Unites States employees, and (6) conspiracy to destroy property.  See 
Second Superseding Indictment at 1, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 
480 (E.D. Va. filed July 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66826/ 0.pdf. 
 3. I am sure that many defense lawyers model themselves after Gregory 
Peck’s moving portrayal of Atticus Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird.  See generally TO 
KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Studios 1962). 
 4. For a model of transferring a prisoner from one realm to another, 
consider Jose Padilla’s transfer from custody under a material witness warrant to 
the custody of U.S. military authorities.  See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 
2716 (2004) (noting that Padilla was taken into custody by Department of Defense 
officials and transported to a Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina, where he 
has been held ever since). 
2
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military policies relating to the national security.”5  The President, 
in making this decision on Moussaoui’s next address, should 
consider our relations with foreign countries and the safety of our 
homeland.6  But whatever happens to Moussaoui, he did not—and 
does not—belong in criminal custody.  That is the straightforward 
thesis of this article. 
The Bush Administration, in many public statements, has said 
that September 11 changed everything about U.S. counter-
terrorism policy.7  To the dismay of critics, many of them in the 
legal academy, the Bush Administration has described this policy as 
a “war” against terrorism.8  Whether we call it a policy or a war, 
dealing with individuals and organizations that seek our 
destruction is serious business.9  Prior generations won the Cold 
War to protect us.  It is up to this generation, and perhaps future 
generations, to succeed in a new struggle to preserve our nation 
 
 5. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, tit. I, § 101, 61 Stat. 496. 
 6. One possible option would be a transfer to foreign authorities, with 
France, the country of Moussaoui’s citizenship, being an obvious example.  Other 
options include a military facility within the United States (e.g., the brig in 
Norfolk, Virginia), a military facility within U.S. territory (e.g., Guam), a military 
facility in a place whose jurisdictional status is not completely clear as a result of 
recent Supreme Court precedent (e.g., Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), or a facility on a 
mobile platform (e.g., an aircraft carrier that stays out to sea). 
 7. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress 
and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov 
/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (describing the United States’ 
concerted and protracted effort against terrorism); President George W. Bush, 
Radio Address of the President to the Nation (Sept. 15, 2001), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2001/09/20010915.html (describing 
the United States’ concerted and protracted effort against terrorism); Press 
Release, President George W. Bush, At O’Hare, President Says “Get on Board,” 
Remarks by the President to Airline Employees (Sept. 27, 2001), at  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010927-1.html (stating 
that America is fighting a “new type of war”). 
 8. PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, & SECURITY:  WINNING WITHOUT 
WAR 19-33 (BCSIA Studies in International Security ed., 2003) (arguing, inter alia, 
that intelligence and international law should be used to construct our nation’s 
counter-terrorism framework and that a military-based “war” on terrorism runs 
counter to traditional American policies). 
 9. For the consensus of a bipartisan panel of experts, see, e.g., 9/11 REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 363–64. 
[To] [c]all[] this struggle a war accurately describes the use of American 
and allied armed forces to find and destroy terrorist groups and their 
allies in the field . . . . But long-term success demands the use of all 
elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law 
enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and 
homeland defense. 
Id. 
3
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and our values.  For this reason, the Moussaoui case, which has 
languished in our courts for over three years, is a sad relic of the 
past, a modern version of Bleak House,10 a bitter reminder of a time 
when we naively believed that terrorism was more a law 
enforcement problem than a national security problem.11  Now that 
the Bush Administration has settled into a second term, it should 
be less concerned about the political fallout from controversial 
decisions and more intent on trying to do what is right.12  The time, 
if ever, for empty posturing is over.  Transferring Moussaoui to 
military custody would thus be a sign of strength, serving as a first 
step in a more reasoned and strategic policy for dealing with 
terrorists.13 
This article, after giving a brief history of the Moussaoui case,14 
identifies the main paradoxes or problems of continuing to deal 
with him in the criminal system.15  By no stretch of the imagination 
does this article provide an exhaustive or comprehensive treatment 
of the Moussaoui case.  Each problem, by itself, could be the 
subject of a separate law review article.  This article suggests that 
Moussaoui, rather than Yaser Esam Hamdi, or Jose Padilla, or the 
detainees in Guantanamo Bay, could have served as the true test for 
determining the minimum process that the American 
Constitutional system owes to an individual whose goal is our 
 
 10. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 50 (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 
1971) (1853).  In this Dickens novel, it was the Jardyce case that seemingly 
dragged on forever. 
 11. In this regard, my criticism goes beyond political orientations.  As many 
have noted and admitted, neither the Clinton Administration nor the Bush 
Administration got “it”—“it” referring to the gravity of the danger from Islamic 
extremists.  For a view that the Clinton Administration got “it” more than the Bush 
Administration, see Richard Clarke’s polemical book, Against All Enemies: Inside 
America’s War on Terror.  RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES:  INSIDE 
AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR (Free Press 2004) [hereinafter AGAINST ALL ENEMIES].  
For a view that the threat was out there for us to see as long ago as the Iranian 
Revolution in the late 1970s, see id. at 36–37 (stating that the Iranian Revolution 
“drew America further into the realm of Islam”). 
 12. In this regard, after John Kerry’s defeat, President Bush’s statement that 
he “earned [political] capital in the campaign, and now . . . intend[s] to spend it 
on . . . winning the war on terror,” can be seen as a positive.  Press Release, 
President George W. Bush, President Holds Press Conference (Nov. 4, 2004), at  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041104-5.html. 
 13. To show this strength, it makes most sense to transfer Moussaoui at a time 
in the case, whether in district court or in the Fourth Circuit, when the public 
does not perceive that the legal rulings are going against the government. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
4
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annihilation.16  The distinction between the Moussaoui case and 
the Hamdi/Padilla cases is that Moussaoui is not a U.S. citizen.  
The distinction between the Moussaoui case and the 
Hamdi/Padilla/Guantanamo cases is that the Bush Administration 
has offered more convincing evidence in public filings that 
Moussaoui was a major player connected to a major terrorist plot.  
The premise of this article is that we should respect our rule of law 
but that we should not treat terrorists any more decently than 
required.17  To do more than the law requires, in an age of weapons 
of mass destruction, is more folly than an act of humanity.18  
Although this article does not address the case of a non-U.S. citizen 
who is a major player arrested outside the United States, it follows 
that someone like Khaled Sheik Mohammed (KSM), the alleged 
 
 16. See Moussaoui Uncooperative in Court (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 22, 
2002), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/04/25/attack/main507248. 
shtml (Moussaoui frequently quoted the Koran and prayed to Allah for the 
destruction of the United States).  For a flavor of the rants and ramblings that led 
Judge Brinkema to revoke Moussaoui’s right of self-representation, see, e.g., 
Defendant’s Motion for Access to Tape at 2, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. 
Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 31, 2003) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/69361/1.pdf (stating 
that prosecutor David Novak is conducting a national therapy session disguised as 
a trial and that “[a]s for America [sic] [p]ost [t]raumatic [d]isorder the [u]nique 
[b]est [l]awyer [Moussaoui] is [g]lad to [p]rovide a [w]ar [t]herapy [c]ompany to 
[t]reat [m]ass [c]asualty of [d]eranged Americans”); Attachment to Defendant’s 
Motion at 2, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 
31, 2003) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/69364/1.pdf (asserting 
that American taxpayers paying for the Moussaoui trial are being robbed by al 
Qaeda); Attachment to Defendant’s Motion at 1, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 
F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 31, 2003) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at  
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/69367/1.pdf (stating 
that he, the infamous twentieth hijacker, is the “little bitch of Leonie Brinkema”); 
Defendant’s Motion to Stipulate Rights & Duties at 1, United States v. Moussaoui, 
282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed July 15, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), 
available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66846/ 
0.pdf (motioning to stipulate his right and duty to live a long and happy life on 
this earth with four wives and to stop Judge Brinkema from misrepresenting his 
fight for life). 
 17. I have not yet joined the cottage industry of offering comprehensive 
advice on counter-terrorism strategy.  Those who do often draw on comparative 
experiences—for example, the Israeli experience with Palestinian terrorism or the 
British experience with IRA terrorism. See, e.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER 
EVIL (Princeton University Press 2004). 
 18. My fear is that historians of future generations will view the United States 
the way we view the British troops who fought against America’s Founding 
Fathers—as old-fashioned types who marched in file in red uniforms, failing to 
adjust to new methods and rules of war. 
5
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mastermind of the 9/11 plot, should not be treated any better than 
Moussaoui.19  This article’s conclusion is that the Moussaoui case is 
better resolved through a military proceeding.20 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE MOUSSAOUI CASE 
The Moussaoui case is back where it started in the Eastern 
District of Virginia.  Judge Brinkema, the presiding judge over the 
prosecution, will set a trial date now that the Supreme Court 
decided not to grant the writ of certiorari filed by the Moussaoui 
defense team concerning how much access they should have to 
three Al Qaeda members—potential witnesses—who are in 
detention.21  The Moussaoui defense team alleged that these 
detainees tend to exculpate Moussaoui from the criminal charges, 
supporting his claim that he was not part of the September 11 plot, 
and tended to mitigate his culpability if the case reaches the death 
penalty stage.22  Unsatisfied with the Fourth Circuit’s most recent 
en banc ruling on these topics, the Moussaoui defense team took 
their case to the highest level in our judicial system.23  As a result, 
Judge Brinkema had kept the case off the court’s trial calendar 
while the Supreme Court decided what to do.24 
Moussaoui was detained weeks before September 11, 2001, 
during the period when the default mode for dealing with 
 
 19. Accordingly, KSM is being held indefinitely for interrogation in an 
undisclosed location.  Human Rights Watch, The U.S.’s “Disappeared”: the CIA’s 
Long-Term “Ghost Detainees,” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BRIEFING PAPER, at 37 (Oct. 
2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/us1004/us1004.pdf. 
 20. See infra Part VII. 
 21. Moussaoui v. United States, 383 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 2005 
WL 218482 (denied without comment). 
 22. See Government’s Motion at 1, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 
2d. 480 (E.D. Va. filed Dec. 2, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/70316/0.pdf 
(ordering that “[u]ntil the Supreme Court has ruled on the petition, and on 
[Moussaoui’s] appeal if the petition is granted, this case will remain stayed to 
conserve limited resources of the judiciary and to minimize disclosure of classified 
information”). 
 23. See Defendant’s Response to Government’s Motion to set a Trial Date at 1, 
United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Nov. 8, 2004) 
(Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-
cr-00455/docs/ 70295/0.pdf. 
 24. See Order at 2, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 
filed Dec. 2, 2004) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at  
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/70316/0.pdf (refusing 
to set a trial date). 
6
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terrorists was through law enforcement.25  In response to tips from 
a flight school in Minnesota about a suspicious flight student—who, 
with scant flying knowledge, desired training as an “ego boosting 
thing” and wanted to “take off and land” a Boeing 747—special 
agents from the Minneapolis field office of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) began an investigation into Moussaoui’s strange 
practices.26  Moussaoui was first held, not on terrorism charges, but 
on immigration violations.27  As the public has learned from former 
FBI supervisor Coleen Rowley and others, the special agents 
pleaded with bureaucrats at FBI headquarters to authorize a 
warrant to search Moussauoi’s computer under the Federal 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).28  Yet, FBI headquarters, as 
publicized by hearings before the Joint Inquiry Staff and the 9/11 
Commission, did not believe they had sufficient evidence 
connecting Moussaoui to a foreign power for purposes of FISA.29 
 
 25. The first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 resulted in 
convictions against Mohammad Salameh, Nidal A. Ayyad, Mahmud Abouhalima, 
Ahmad Ajajfour, Ramzi Yousef, and Eyad Ismoil.  William C. Banks & M.E. 
Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 98–
99 (2000).  The attacks on U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 resulted 
in convictions against Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-‘Owhali, Khalfan Khamis 
Mohamed, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, and Wadih el Hage.  Phil Hirschkorn, Four 
Guilty in Embassy Bombings Trial (May 30, 2001), available at  
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/05/29/ embassy.bombings.03/. 
 26. The pre-September 11 period to the Moussaoui case is summarized in the 
9/11 Report.  9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 273–76. 
 27. Id. at  247. 
 28. Id. at 273–74. 
 29. See The FBI’s Handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication & Investigation 
of Zacarias Moussaoui Prior to Sept. 11, 2001: Hearings Before the Select Committee on 
Intelligence, U.S. Senate & the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Rep., 
107th Cong. 19–20 (2002), available at  http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/ 
0209hrg/020924/hill.pdf  (prepared statement of Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, 
Joint Inquiry Staff noting that a misunderstanding between FBI headquarters and 
Minneapolis led to the conclusion that there was insufficient information to show 
that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power under FISA); see also 9/11 REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 274.  To obtain a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA), the Justice Department needs to show, inter alia, that the 
search or the electronic surveillance relates to a “foreign power” or “an agent of a 
foreign power.”  50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2002).  FISA—only applicable within 
the United States—is Congress’s arrangement, in response to the landmark “Keith” 
decision, United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), to regulate electronic surveillance and searches for 
national security purposes within the United States.  FISA has withstood all general 
attacks on its constitutionality.  See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (2002) 
(holding that the government may, without contravening the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, conduct surveillance of an agent of a foreign 
power if the “significant purpose” of such surveillance is foreign intelligence). 
7
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So, in an attempt to gather additional evidence, the FBI special 
agents initiated requests—what they call leads—for assistance from 
foreign authorities, including France and Britain.30  Disappointed 
that FBI headquarters was not giving Moussaoui the attention the 
special agents believed he deserved, they opened a back channel to 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).31  From the CIA, they 
sought information and assistance.  Part of the assistance they 
sought was in dealing with their own bureaucracy.32  It was in this 
way that senior officials at the CIA received more comprehensive 
briefings about Moussaoui than did the upper echelons of the 
FBI.33 
The U.S. authorities, operating under the old paradigm, were 
not sure they had the grounds for a FISA warrant, a regular search 
warrant, or an arrest warrant in the Moussaoui case.34  Accordingly, 
rather than think beyond the law enforcement paradigm, they 
searched for another justification for Moussaoui’s detention within 
the existing paradigm.35  Accordingly, on August 15, 2001, a 
material witness warrant was issued against Moussaoui.36 
Three weeks later, on that fateful September day, while the FBI 
was still waiting for some responses from foreign authorities, 
nineteen hijackers boarded four commercial planes.37  Meanwhile, 
Moussaoui, the evidence related to him, and possible connections 
between him and other terrorists remained on hold while two 
planes crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, a 
third plane took out a chunk of the Pentagon, and a fourth plane, 
thanks to the heroics of the passengers who learned that their 
hijackers intended to use their plane as a missile, crashed into a 
field in Pennsylvania, killing everyone on board.  That is perhaps 
 
 30. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 274. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 275–76. 
 33. See id. at 275 (stating that neither of the FBI’s top two officials were 
briefed about Moussaoui prior to September 11, 2001, but the Director of Central 
Intelligence was briefed on Moussaoui on August 23, 2001). 
 34. Id. at 274–76. 
 35. It is not clear why the authorities did not continue to hold Moussaoui for 
immigration violations.  Perhaps U.S. authorities, fearful of letting a big fish get 
away, had no intention of deporting him. 
 36. Under the federal material witness statute, “[i]f it appears . . . that the 
testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it 
may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a 
judicial officer may order the arrest of the person.”  18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2001). 
 37. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 274. 
8
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the tragedy within the tragedy—the lingering thoughts that the 
catastrophe could have been averted if our officials had better 
performed their jobs and if the legal structures had not gotten in 
their way.38  The dire predictions from FBI special agents about 
Moussaoui and other suspicious individuals came true.  Later, while 
the World Trade Center was smoldering in ruins, after investigators 
and prosecutors had gathered enough evidence to convince a 
grand jury that there was probable cause that Moussaoui had 
committed a crime, he was arraigned on federal charges and held 
without bail in the Alexandria Detention Center.39 
Other than the initial inquiries the FBI made of Moussaoui 
while he was in flight school and before his arrest, it does not 
appear from the public record that U.S. authorities have been able 
to interrogate Moussaoui.  Worse, honoring the rights of a criminal 
defendant who claimed to be indigent, the United States has 
provided Moussaoui with legal counsel, and the taxpayers have 
 
 38. Ahmed Ressam, once bent on blowing up the Los Angeles airport as a 
part of the Millenium Plot, was cooperating with U.S. authorities before 
September 11.  It has been reported that Ressam later tied evidence from 
Moussaoui to the Hamburg cell that played a leading role in executing the 
September 11 plot.  See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 275–76 (noting that Ressam’s 
cooperation with investigators helped to link Moussaoui to Afghan terrorist 
camps); see also Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, What the PDB Didn’t Say: Perhaps 
George Bush Would Have Paid More Attention to the August Memo if it had Contained 
Some of What was Already Known About Al Qaeda’s Activities, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 14, 2004, 
available at http://64.233.167.104/ search?q=cache:OGkHHl06NkoJ:editor.msn. 
com/id/4741570/ (stating that Ressam told American officials that he recognized 
Moussaoui as an Afghan training camp student who was tied to the Hamburg-
based terrorist cell).  Therefore, this is one of those “what if” scenarios that 
analysts and many other citizens will ponder for years.  Could the plot have been 
unraveled if these connections were allowed to be made before September 11?  It 
has also been reported that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the “mastermind” behind 
the September 11 plot, would have called off the operation if he had believed that 
there was a significant possibility that Moussaoui, in detention, was giving 
information to U.S. authorities.  See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 276.  The 
interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh also revealed that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
would have called off the 9/11 attacks had he been cognizant of Moussaoui’s 
arrest.  Id. at 541 n.107 (citing INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Interrogation of Ramzi 
Binalshibh, Feb. 14, 2003).  “Intelligence Reports,” cited in the 9/11 Report, are 
actually identical to what the CIA refers to as “cables.”  Cables are simply (1) 
communications between operatives and CIA headquarters or (2) 
communications between operatives themselves. 
 39. Larry Margasak, Citing Need to Resolve Motions, Judge Won’t Set Moussaoui 
Trial, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2004, at 26, available at 2004 WL 100743817 (noting that 
Moussaoui is being held in the Washington suburbs at Alexandria’s detention 
center). 
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gotten the bill.40  Defense counsel, at their first meeting with 
Moussaoui, almost surely advised him not to volunteer any 
statements to the authorities or to other prisoners.  This is standard 
practice. Even when Moussaoui was representing himself, having 
relegated his counsel to standby status, he sometimes seemed 
shrewd enough not to make any obvious admissions to the 
charges.41  In any event, at no time did American officials have the 
opportunity to interrogate Moussaoui in the aggressive fashion that 
is being used on KSM and other Al Qaeda cohorts whom we treat 
as terrorists rather than criminals.42  These other terrorists are 
 
 40. Indeed, Moussaoui relishes in the fact that American taxpayers are 
footing the bill for his legal representation.  See Defendant’s Motion at 1, United 
States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 31, 2003) (Criminal 
No. 01-455-A), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-
00455/docs/69364/1.pdf (stating that “[Judge Brinkema] must release $260,000 
of American Taxpayer money to pay for al Qaeda pro se suicide legal operation . . 
. [and] . . . God willing the 12 American Taxpayer[s] [sic] will enjoy the $260,000 
show . . . what about the $260,000 day light robbery by al Qaeda”). 
 41. See Transcript of Plea Hearing at 43, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. 
Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed July 25, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/moussaoui072502. 
htm (speaking only in hypothetical terms).  At one point, while Moussaoui was 
discussing the possibility of pleading guilty to charges, he admitted to Judge 
Brinkema that he is a “member of al Qaeda . . . [and] pledge[s] bayat [allegiance] 
to Osama bin Ladin.”  Transcript of Arraignment & Motions Hearing at 26–27, 
United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed July 18, 2002) 
(Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at http://web.elastic.org/~fche/mirrors/ 
cryptome.org/usa-v-zm-071082.htm.  These are damning admissions in the face of 
conspiracy charges.  But Moussaoui has consistently denied that he had any role in 
the September 11 plot.  Transcript of Plea Hearing at 43, United States v. 
Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed July 25, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-
455-A), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/ 
moussaoui072502.htm (stating “I did not know about September 11.”). 
 42. See Jonathan F. Lenzner, From a Pakistani Stationhouse to the Federal 
Courthouse: A Confession’s Uncertain Journey in the U.S.-Led War on Terror, 12 CARDOZO 
J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 297, 299–300 n.13 (2004) (noting that “[b]efore [Khalid 
Sheikh] Mohammed’s capture, U.S. officials decided that they would not to [sic] 
bring him to the United States to stand trial.  Officials reasoned that obtaining 
intelligence from the September 11 mastermind superseded the competing 
interest in bringing him to justice in U.S. courts”) (citation omitted)).  At least 
one commentator argues that the use of overly aggressive interrogation tactics on 
suspected terrorists (e.g., Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and John Walker Lindh) has 
undermined the United States’ efforts to prosecute them in the United States due 
to legal restraints and political hurdles.  Id. at 299–300.  See also Human Rights 
Watch, The U.S.’s “Disappeared”: the CIA’s Long-Term “Ghost Detainees,” HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH BRIEFING PAPER, at 37–38 (Oct. 2004), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/us1004/us1004.pdf (noting that CIA 
torture techniques patently prohibited in criminal cases—such as water 
submersion—are so severe that FBI officials have ordered its agents to preclude 
10
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correctly being treated under what could be described as a new 
intelligence paradigm. 
 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CRIMINAL SYSTEM 
 
A. A Boomerang to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
 
In a twist on how Al Qaeda used commercial aircraft against us 
as missiles, this terrorist group could use our own rules concerning 
criminal discovery.  In particular, senior managers in Al Qaeda 
could instruct their troops that in the event the foot soldiers are 
captured and detained, they should weave false information into 
their tales.  They might do their best to exculpate Moussaoui and 
other Al Qaeda members who are held in the U.S. criminal system.  
That way, they could turn defeats into victories.  Although Al 
Qaeda might not train operatives in exclusive missions of 
disinformation, it is not out of the question.  If this network can 
convince operatives to conduct suicide missions, its leaders 
probably can convince their operatives to allow themselves to be 
detained for the exclusive purpose of helping out a person whom 
the leaders would describe as “brother Moussaoui.”  From Al 
Qaeda’s perspective, they can get more bang for their buck on pure 
operations of destruction.  More likely, as fallbacks to failed 
missions, operatives might be instructed and trained in planting 
false exculpatory information, and to do so in a subtle way to 
maximize the chances that their captors believe the lies.43 
According to American experts, Al Qaeda’s tradecraft is good, 
already including counter-surveillance and counter-interrogation 
tactics.44  Therefore, false exculpation would be a dangerous 
 
themselves from taking part in high-level detainee interrogations so that the 
officials would not be compromised in future criminal cases). 
 43. By contrast, I doubt that the allegiances are so strong in organized crime 
groups or narcotics trafficking organizations that members would risk additional 
perjury charges to exculpate other members.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1622, 1623 
(2001) (providing five-year felonies relating respectively to perjury, suborning 
perjury, and making false declarations before a grand jury or court); see also 18 
U.S.C. § 1001 (2001) (applying broadly to all individuals who make false 
statements “in any matter” before any of the three branches of government).  
Unlike the situation with detainees held by intelligence agencies, in the situation 
with mobsters and traffickers, law enforcement officials would be in a position to 
assess and challenge the potential for false exculpatory information. 
 44. See, e.g., Arthur H. Garrison, The War on Terrorism on the Judicial Front, Part 
II:  The Courts Strike Back, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 473, 513 (2004) (discussing the Al 
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addition to their repertoire.  Such disinformation missions are 
more effective within the legal process when the United States 
Government treats Al Qaeda members as law enforcement 
problems rather than military problems. 
We know that some detainees have passed on disinformation.45  
What is not clear, especially for those of us in the unclassified 
sector, is whether these detainees have passed on disinformation in 
Moussaoui’s case. 
This disinformation possibility, of course, comes from Brady v. 
Maryland46 and from Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure,47 which require prosecutors to provide exculpatory and 
other discovery to criminal defendants.  Even so, why Justice 
Department prosecutors must turn over information from the files 
of intelligence agencies is not obvious on the face of the rules.  The 
answer comes from the Justice Department’s broad view of which 
 
Qaeda training manual, Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants, which 
provides instructions on collecting intelligence, counter-interrogation techniques, 
and means of communication during detention); John T. Nason, Conducting 
Surveillance Operations, F.B.I. LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., May 1, 2004, vol. 73, iss. 5, at 
5, available at 2004 WL 69837618 (noting that “as part of Al-Qaeda specialized 
training, operatives are instructed to follow meticulous operational security.  
Tactics include conducting dry runs prior to becoming operational, using 
secondary roads and public transportation to flush out surveillance, and 
employing prearranged signals to communicate the absence or presence of 
surveillance to other Al-Qaeda members”);  Press Briefing, Judge Albert Gonzales 
et al., White House Counsel (June 22, 2004), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/print/20040622-14.html (stating 
that many of the detainees have been trained in counter-interrogation 
techniques). 
 45. See, e.g., 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 146 (“[a]ssessing the truth of 
statements by these witnesses—sworn enemies of the United States—is 
challenging”); see also id. at 488 n.4 (calling claims made by Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed that he contemplated assassinating Rabbi Meir Kahane when Kahane 
lectured in Greensboro, North Carolina, “uncorroborated” and “mere bravado”) 
(citing INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003); National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., 12th Public Hearing, (June 16, 2004), 
available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-
11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-16.htm (commenting that Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, providing many of the details described in the 9/11 Report, may be a 
source of disinformation). 
 46. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the “suppression by the prosecution 
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith 
or bad faith of the prosecution”). 
 47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (prescribing what the government must disclose to 
a defendant, such as the defendant’s own statement if the statement is in “the 
government’s possession, custody, or control,”  as well as photographs, documents 
or books if they are “within the government’s possession, custody, or control”). 
12
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agencies fall within the definition of “government.”48  The criminal 
discovery rules require compliance from the government, not the 
Justice Department.49  On some cases, the Justice Department has 
determined that other agencies, such as the Central Intelligence 
Agency or the National Security Agency, are so “aligned” with the 
prosecution through the sharing of information and personnel that 
prosecutors have a duty to search the files of those other agencies, 
in addition to searching their own files, for information that is 
responsive to defense requests and defense rights.50  The classic 
example for alignment is an espionage prosecution, say, of Aldrich 
Ames.51  Yet the Justice Department has also seen alignments in 
narcotics cases (e.g., the prosecution of the former Panamanian 
leader, Manuel Noriega) and in most terrorism cases from the 
“shoe bomber” Richard Reid to John Walker Lindh.52 
Al Qaeda scours our media for clues about refining their 
tradecraft.  Indeed it is reported that Osama Bin Laden stopped 
using his cell phones after a newspaper article appeared in which 
someone was too open about the United States Government’s 
ability to monitor Bin Laden’s conversations.53  An organization 
 
 48. See id. (using the phrase “the government must disclose”) (emphasis 
added). 
 49. Id. 
 50. For a discussion of alignment, see, e.g., Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence 
Agencies, Law Enforcement, and the Prosecution Team, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 331, 
347–49 (1998) (asserting that although alignment issues commonly arise in the 
area of international terrorism—where intelligence and law enforcement 
overlap—neither Congress nor the courts have yet to describe precise boundaries 
of disclosure obligations under Brady, the Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2001)), 
and Rule 16).  Within the Justice Department, the Counter-Espionage Section, 
formerly called the Internal Security Section, is viewed as the one of the chief 
purveyors of a broad view of alignment. 
 51. For further discussion of Aldrich Ames see PETE EARLEY, CONFESSIONS OF A 
SPY: THE REAL STORY OF ALDRICH AMES 332 (1997). 
 52. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(General Manuel Noriega was convicted in a jury trial and sentenced to 
consecutive imprisonment terms of twenty, fifteen, and five years); see United 
States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2002) (John Walker 
Lindh pled guilty to supplying services to the Taliban and carrying an explosive 
during the commission of a felony.  Lindh was sentenced to 20 years in prison); see 
United States v. Reid, 369 F.3d 619, 620 (1st Cir. 2004) (Richard Reid pled guilty 
to eight terrorism-related offenses and was sentenced to life in prison). 
 53. See, e.g., Paul Haven, And He Never Comes Up for Air. Osama Bin Laden Has 
Adopted a Low-Tech Approach, Using Pen and Ink Instead of Cell-Phones and Satellites, 
Making Him Just about Impossible to Trace, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 15, 2004, at 
4A (noting that Bin Laden has resorted to conveying messages via letter to remain 
undetectable by the intelligence community); Michael Hirsh & John Barry, The 
13
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that is crafty and evil enough to turn our planes back on us would 
only have to surf the Internet for a few minutes to come up with 
some of the ideas outlined in this article.  Further, if Al Qaeda 
wanted to bury the United States Government in paper they might 
file a series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 54  requests 
through front persons and front organizations for access to official 
documents. 
Almost surely, there is nothing in place in the discovery 
process that allows prosecutors to ferret out false information from 
detainees.  Neither the prosecutors nor the court has had direct 
access to the unnamed detainees.55  The prosecutors and the court 
may have been told the names of the detainees in confidence, but 
 
Hunt Heats Up; the Man in Charge of Catching Osama Bin Laden ‘Can Drive a Knife 
through your Ribs in a Nanosecond.’ Inside the Search, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 2004, at 46, 
available at 2004 WL 62584640 (reporting that Bin Laden no longer uses electronic 
means of communication). 
 54. By my reading, FOIA puts very few limits on who can make requests for 
official information.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2001). For discussion of FOIA, see, e.g.. 
Themes Karalis, Foreign Policy and Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: Executive Orders 
Regarding Export Administration Act Extension in Times of Lapse as a Political Question, 
12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 109, 110–21 (2004) (noting the historical 
development, purposes, and exemptions of FOIA); Keith Anderson, Note, Is There 
Still a “Sound Legal Basis?”: The Freedom of Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 64 
OHIO ST. L. J. 1605, 1605 (2003) (arguing that “courts should defer to the 
decisions of law enforcement agencies to withhold information requests under 
FOIA to promote greater homeland protection”). 
 55. Judge Brinkema denied Moussaoui’s motions for pretrial access and the 
trial appearance of unnamed detainees and ordered that the “United States make 
[undisclosed persons] available for trial testimony in the form of a videotaped 
deposition pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 under [undisclosed] conditions.”  See 
Order, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Jan. 31, 
2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68180/1.pdf. 
However, the prosecution refused to comply with the court order and offered to 
provide Moussaoui with mere written summations of statements made by the 
detainees to government interrogators.  United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-
455-A, 2003 WL 21277161, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2003).  As a result of this blatant 
refusal to comply, Judge Brinkema sanctioned the prosecution by precluding it 
from seeking the death penalty or “making any argument, or offering any 
evidence, suggesting that [Moussaoui] had any involvement in, or knowledge of, 
the September 11 attacks.”  United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 
(E.D. Va. 2003).  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the sanctions imposed on 
the government and further held that although the government’s currently 
proposed substitutions for detainees’ deposition were inadequate, some form of 
redacted written summaries of detainees’ testimony would be sufficient—thereby 
evading the manifest security risk posed by direct and/or videotaped deposition 
testimony without contravening the Sixth Amendment.  United States v. 
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 479, 482 (4th Cir. 2004). 
14
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not where they were being held.56  The prosecutors and the court 
seem to be relying on cables or summaries of the interrogations, 
possibly done by American interrogators from various U.S. 
agencies, or possibly done with the assistance of foreign officials.57  
The interrogators of the detainees do not answer to the 
prosecutors and do not share their training, their outlook, or their 
mission.  As much as it has become fashionable to speak about 
cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, 
about breaking down the stovepipes, about a national intelligence 
czar, there are still many areas of separation and disconnect.  Even 
the 9/11 Commission, which was able to convince the Government 
to acknowledge the names of some Al Qaeda detainees, was not 
allowed direct access to these detainees.58  These aggressive 
interrogations are the keys to the Bush Administration’s crown 
jewels. 
In the Moussaoui case, the Justice Department prosecutors, 
assisted by teams from the Counter-Terrorism Section at the 
Criminal Division, have spent hundreds of hours reviewing 
thousands of documents at several U.S. agencies to comply with 
their view of discovery obligations.  Much of the back and forth 
between Judge Brinkema in the district court and the judges at the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has related to defining the 
 
 56. In covering hearings in the Moussaoui case, the media have been diligent 
in determining which high-value detainees Moussaoui wants access to and where 
they are located.  At times, this diligence simply applies to filling in blanks in the 
redacted filings.  See Order, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. 
Va. Jan. 31, 2003) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68180/1.pdf (stating 
that “defense motions [redacted] are DENIED to the extent that they request 
pretrial access to [redacted] DENIED to the extent the motions seek to compel 
the trial appearances of [redacted] and GRANTED to the extent that they seek to 
compel the trial appearances of [redacted]”). 
 57. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 460–62 n.14  (4th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that the prosecution team does not receive reports from the intelligence 
community which are specifically tailored to the Moussaoui prosecution; rather, 
the reports merely contain information that has general foreign intelligence 
value). 
 58. See David Johnston & Don Van Natta Jr., Threats & Responses:  The 
Interrogations; Account of Plot Sets Off Debate Over Credibility, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2004, 
at A1 (reporting that the “[9/11] commission staff members . . . did not have 
direct access to any detainee and had based their account on intelligence reports 
drawn from the interrogations”); J. Scott Orr, 9/11 Panel Sends Questions to Captured 
Al Qaeda Terrorists, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), May 12, 2004, at 9 (noting that the 
9/11 Commission was merely allowed to pose questions to detainees, rather than 
have direct access). 
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contours of Moussaoui’s right of access to detainees whose names 
the U.S. Government has not even acknowledged.  This access 
derives from discovery rules, Fifth Amendment due process 
protections, and Sixth Amendment trial rights.  So armed, 
Moussaoui’s lawyers have been somewhat successful in convincing 
the court that Moussaoui has some right to the classified 
information in the case.59  This right applies to both the guilt and 
penalty phases of the trial.60   
In several opinions, Judge Brinkema has noted the acute 
importance of Moussaoui’s right to information from the detainees 
since the Government has made this a death penalty case.61  
Further, Judge Brinkema has suggested that if the Government 
would like to protect classified information by cutting corners on 
legal process, it should do so in a different forum.62  Although the 
judge cannot ensure the integrity of the legal process in all places, 
namely military tribunals, she can make sure that Article III courts 
keep to the old standards.63  Even the opinions from the 
conservative Fourth Circuit have only questioned the scope of 
 
 59. In the current posture of the case, Moussaoui is said to have a right to 
classified summaries of exculpatory information that the detainees have given, but 
not a right to present questions directly to the detainees themselves.  See United 
States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 479 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that redacted 
summaries are a sufficient proxy for detainees’ deposition testimony). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 
21263699, at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003) (stating that Moussaoui has a compelling 
right to receive a fair trial); United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 486–
87 (E.D. Va. 2003) (noting that Moussaoui’s access to detainees is necessary to 
procure reliable evidence, which is indispensable to the “determination that death 
is the appropriate punishment”) (citation omitted)); United States v. Moussaui, 
282 F. Supp. 2d at 482 (stating that “the United States may not maintain this 
capital prosecution while simultaneously refusing to produce witnesses who could, 
at minimum, help [Moussaoui] avoid a sentence of death”) (citations omitted)). 
 62. United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at *6 
(E.D. Va. filed Dec. 11, 2001) (“To the extent that the United States seeks a 
categorical, “wartime” exception to the Sixth Amendment, it should reconsider 
whether the civilian criminal courts are the appropriate forum in which to 
prosecute alleged terrorists captured in the context of an ongoing war.”);  see also 
Associated Press, Judge Jibes Feds in Moussaoui Trial (Apr. 4, 2003), at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/24/attack/main550876.shtml 
(discussing Judge Brinkema’s concern over the extent to which the United States 
has classified court documents). 
 63. This notion of keeping the existing constitutional system free from the 
taints of emergency accommodations has support at more theoretical levels.  See, 
e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047–49 
(2004) (proposing that a special grant of emergency powers to the Executive be 
subject to increasing super-majorities in the Congress). 
16
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Moussaoui’s constitutional rights, not their existence.64  In tandem 
with the district court, the Fourth Circuit’s debate has been focused 
on what form the discovery and the evidence should take, with the 
Government pushing for watered down versions of detainee 
statements when it has not been able to convince the Court that 
Moussaoui has no right to that classified information. 
The Justice Department has provided Moussaoui’s defense 
team, but not Moussaoui himself, with classified discovery.  These 
defense lawyers have security clearances that require them to 
handle the classified information with great care, and these defense 
lawyers have signed agreements with the United States promising 
not to share this information with Moussaoui. 
The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)65 does not 
solve the problem of greymail that lurks behind the Moussaoui 
case.66  Greymail is the process by which the prosecution is forced 
to drop charges or to limit charges because of the defendant’s use 
of classified information or the threat of using classified 
information.67  CIPA merely ensures that these problems are dealt 
with pre-trial rather than in the middle of trial.68  Under CIPA, it is 
very unlikely that the Court would require the Government to turn 
over raw intelligence cables or raw intercepts.69  Under section 3, 
the prosecutors have had the Court enter protective orders for 
handling classified information in the Moussaoui case.70  Under 
section 4, concerning classified discovery, and under section 6, 
concerning the use of classified information at trial, CIPA gives the 
Government the right to propose summaries and substitutions for 
the classified information.71  A common method of substitution, 
 
 64. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 482 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(“Because the Government will not allow Moussaoui to have contact with the 
witnesses, we must provide a remedy adequate to protect Moussaoui’s 
constitutional rights.”); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 464–75 (4th Cir. 
2003). 
 65. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2001). 
 66. See Cameron Stracher, Eyes Tied Shut: Litigating for Access under CIPA in the 
Government’s “War on Terror,” 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 173 (2004) (containing a 
discussion of CIPA and graymail in the Moussaoui context). 
 67. United States v. Lee, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1328 & n. 5 (D.N.M. 2000). 
 68. Id. 
 69. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2001). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4. 
The court . . . may authorize the United States to delete specified items of 
classified information from documents to be made available to the 
defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
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familiar to many through documents that are made public in 
response to FOIA requests or through government declassification 
programs, is redactions of the original sources.  Yet, even after 
summaries and substitutions, if the U.S. Government cannot bear 
the pain of having to turn over classified discovery to a terrorist, the 
only remedy is to dismiss the prosecution.72 
At least in the criminal realm, the rights of defendants trump 
the government’s need for secrecy.73  This is the specter that has 
haunted the Moussaoui prosecutors from the beginning of their 
case, the leaks and rumors from officials at the White House and 
the Defense Department who have said that whenever it becomes 
clear that the price is too high for dealing with Moussaoui in an 
Article III court, he will be swept over to the military system.74  
There, a defendant’s rights are more limited and the ability to 
protect classified information more ample.75   
Although the back and forth between the Rumsfelds and the 
Ashcrofts is well-suited to Washington parlor games, the thesis of 
this article is that reasonable people have known all along that 
Moussaoui belongs in military detention.  It is time for those 
people to come out of their closets.  Under a military paradigm, 
Moussaoui would be interrogated and his computer and 
belongings searched without any hand-wringing.  Wherever 
Moussaoui is detained, he may not be tortured.76  The treatment 
 
Procedure, to substitute a summary of the information for such classified 
documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the 
classified information would tend to prove. 
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(1)(a)–(b) (“[T]he United States may move that 
. . . the court order the substitution for such classified information of a statement 
admitting relevant facts that the specific classified information would tend to 
prove or the substitution for such classified information of a summary of the 
specific classified information.”). 
 72. This dismissal requires the Attorney General’s approval.  See 18 U.S.C. 
app. 3 § 12. 
 73. Lee, 90 F.Supp at 1328 n.5 (noting that a criminal defendant has a 
“fundamental right” to cross examine witnesses for the prosecution); see also 
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (stating that it is “unconscionable” 
to invoke a government privilege in order to deprive the accused anything which 
might be material to his or her defense). 
 74. CBS, Military Tribunal for 6 Suspects (July 3, 2003), at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/18/attack/main563920.shtml. 
 75. See MIL. R. EVID. 505(a) in 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., MILITARY RULES 
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 5–52 (5th ed. 2003) (“Classified information is privileged 
from disclosure if disclosure would be detrimental to the national security.”). 
 76. Torture violates domestic law and international law.  See United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
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that prisoners received at Abu Gharib prison in Iraq is the work of 
hoods and hooligans.  It is not the work of intelligence 
professionals who, through skill, patience, and often good luck, pry 
information out of people to disrupt terrorist plots and to protect 
the innocent. 
B. Faretta Issues 
At one stage during the Moussaoui saga, Judge Brinkema 
allowed Moussaoui to represent himself.  She held lengthy hearings 
on this issue in which she strived to meet the Constitutional 
standards under Faretta v. California.77  As Moussaoui learned, 
however, the right to proceed pro se is not absolute, and, in 
response to his long pattern of antics and abuse, Judge Brinkema 
revoked Moussaoui’s right to represent himself.78   
Moussaoui probably does not realize all the opportunities he 
had to use the criminal system back against our Government.  
Otherwise, he would have been able to put more pressure on the 
prosecution by keeping his mouth shut and insisting that the 
classified discovery be shared directly with him.  As much as 
possible, he would have reduced the role of “cleared” standby 
counsel as intermediaries and repositories of classified information.  
The intelligence agencies, more narrow in their view of law 
enforcement-intelligence alignment, would have been outraged at 
the possibility of having to share information with someone the 
Government considers a terrorist. 
 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. 
Doc. A/39/51 (1984), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ 
instree/h2catoc.htm; see 18 U.S.C.  §§ 2340–2340A (2001).  This Act went into 
effect October 26, 2001, and contains prohibitions against torture, as well as 
setting serious penalties for any violations.  Id.; see also Memorandum from Daniel 
Levin, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, 
to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General (Dec. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf.  This memo, known as the “Torture 
Memo,” contains a lengthy analysis of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, the use of torture, 
and further clarification and analysis of the phrase “severe pain.”  Id. 
 77. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).  Faretta is the leading case for the right to proceed 
pro se. 
 78. See id. at 834 n.46 (“[T]he trial judge may terminate self-representation by 
a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”); 
Order, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed Nov. 11, 
2003) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/694120/0.pdf (“[The 
defendant’s] pleadings include contemptuous language that would never be 
tolerated from an attorney, and will no longer be tolerated from this defendant.”). 
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With American lawyers on Moussaoui’s defense team, there is 
some room for compromises between the Justice Department and 
the intelligence agencies about what is turned over to the defense.  
But if Moussaoui were on his own, wearing both the hats of 
defendant and of defense counsel, the room for compromise 
would be much smaller.  Again, as a part of their tradecraft, Al 
Qaeda might instruct operatives to maintain their composure and 
to insist on self-representation if they find themselves as criminal 
defendants in our courts.  Again, such perverse scenarios tend to 
exist when terrorists are viewed as criminals with broad rights to 
discovery from the Government, rather than combatants with 
limited procedural rights before military tribunals. 
C. Death Penalty Complications 
For the Government to seek the death penalty in Moussaoui’s 
case, no matter the forum, creates complications.  Yet these 
complications would not be as great in a military tribunal because a 
combatant is entitled to fewer procedural rights before a military 
tribunal.79  That is another reason to move Moussaoui to a military 
tribunal. 
Beyond the details of the Moussaoui case, some broad 
observations about the death penalty in terrorism cases are 
appropriate.  When a statement is repeated enough, whether true 
or not, it often takes on the appearance of truth.  Terrorists, it is 
said, are not deterred by the prospect of penalties in the criminal 
system.80  Terrorists, who are recruited for suicide missions, it is also 
said, are not deterred by the prospect of a death penalty.81  These 
statements, however, may not shine true on closer examination. 
It is quite possible that a terrorist recruit may not flinch at the 
prospect of death in a successful martyr mission.  The terrorist’s 
success will often be consistent with posters and videos and other 
propaganda that were used to recruit him, with selected quotations 
from the Koran, and with distorted visions of martyrs who rise to 
paradise covered in flowers, banners, and praise.82  The would-be 
 
 79. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
 80. Susan M. McGarvey, Missed Opportunity? The Affirmation of the Death Penalty 
in the AEDPA: Extradition Scenario, 24 J. LEGIS. 99, 105 (1998). 
 81. Paul Butler, Forward: Terrorism and Unilateralism: Lessons from and for, 
Criminal Law, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 14 (2002). 
 82. See Jack Kelley, The Secret World of Suicide Bombers, USA TODAY, Jun, 26, 
2001, at 01A, available at 2001 WLNR 3776830. 
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martyr may not be thoroughly consistent or logical, but he is 
usually not so far gone that he does not recognize that his enemies 
do not share his values and may punish him if caught.  The would-
be martyr may hesitate at the thought of languishing in the infidel’s 
prisons or being executed in defeat by the infidel’s sword.83  His 
defeat might then be something to hide or to explain, both to 
himself and to his community.  He may experience shame. 
Such observations are not intended to open up a full debate 
about the propriety of the death penalty.84  By putting aside a 
moral, ethical, and philosophical debate, this article, in an agnostic 
mode, modestly assumes that if anyone deserves to be executed it is 
the terrorist who kills or aims to kill innocents.  The terrorist’s 
attack is a fundamental attack on civilization, a fundamental breach 
of our most basic norms.85  If Moussaoui, for example, would read 
his own holy book carefully he would discover a passage that 
indicates that he who kills one person kills all of humanity.86  There 
is the clear condemnation of his evil thoughts and evil deeds. 
Professor Thomas Michael McDonnell, in contrast to this 
article, argues that the death penalty is counter-productive in 
combating terrorism because this harsh punishment creates more 
hatred for the United States and, in turn, more terrorist recruits 
against us.87  Unlike Professor McDonnell, this article is most 
concerned with the initial ripples from our use of the death penalty 
in terrorism cases, that is, the effects on Justice Department 
investigations and prosecutions.  Whether the American use of the 
 
 83. See id. 
 84. See Richard C. Dieter, International Influence on the Death Penalty in the U.S., 
in 80 FOREIGN SERVICE J. 31 (Steven Alan Honley ed., Oct. 2003), available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=17&did=806; Norman L. 
Greene et al., Capital Punishment in the Age of Terrorism, 41 CATH. LAW. 187 (2002); 
Senator Arlen Specter, The Time Has Come for a Terrorist Death Penalty Law, 95 DICK. 
L. REV. 739 (1991). 
 85. The disease of terrorism was diagnosed at least by the 19th century.  For a 
literary diagnosis of the symptoms and the effects of such nihilism, we can refer to 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s works, particularly Crime and Punishment and The Devils.  
FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Constance Garnett, trans., P.F. 
Collier & Son) (1917); FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE DEVILS (Constance Garnett, 
trans., St. Petersburg) (1873). 
 86. The Dinner Table 5:32 (The Qur’an).  By now, it should be clear that I am 
one of those who believe that Al Qaeda and other Islamic fanatics have hijacked a 
great religion. 
 87. See generally Thomas Michael McDonnell, The Death Penalty – An Obstacle to 
the “War against Terrorism”?, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 353, 389–406 (Mar. 2004) 
(discussing policy considerations and repercussions of executing Al Qaeda 
members). 
21
Radsan: The Moussaoui Case: The Mess from Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
RADSAN (REVISED) 4/25/2005  1:15:51 PM 
1438 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
death penalty creates more recruits for Al Qaeda or creates more 
animosity against us in the “Muslim World” is not clear.  The 
analysis of these outer ripples often depends on impressions as 
much as on data.  Further, the notion of a unified Muslim World 
can easily be deconstructed.88  After all, the death penalty is not 
contrary to Islam; the Muslim World, if one exists, is familiar with 
the death penalty in countries that have both Islamic and non-
Islamic governments.89 
A full discussion concerning retribution and deterrence, 
common arguments in favor of the death penalty, is also beyond 
the scope of this article.  To be sure, a terrorist may not be deterred 
by the death penalty in the same way that murderers, kidnappers, 
or other potential criminals are.  The terrorist has a political and 
religious aspect to his crime that does not usually exist in other 
violent criminals.90  But these observations are not enough to 
dismiss any effect from the death penalty on the grounds of 
retribution and deterrence.  To develop the notion of just 
retribution requires a philosophical analysis that has been left 
aside.  The general deterrence from the death penalty can also be 
questioned, but the specific deterrence of executing a terrorist 
rather than incarcerating him is clear: The executed terrorist, who 
cannot escape from prison, is obviously less of a threat to us than a 
terrorist who is sentenced to life in prison. 
Even so, a more instrumental attack on the death penalty in 
terrorism cases can be made.  The costs of the death penalty, 
whether implemented by a federal district court or a military 
tribunal, may not be worth the benefits in counter-terrorism policy. 
The Justice Department’s decision to seek the death penalty in 
the Moussaoui case was political.91  The American public was 
 
 88. In fairness, Professor McDonnell does recognize the limits of the data.  In 
the absence of facts, he adopts the reasonable position of searching for good 
analogies, for example, the British policies in dealing with terrorism in Northern 
Ireland.  These analogies, of course, only go as far as the factual similarities 
between the two situations being compared.  See, e.g., id. at 401–10 (discussing 
making martyrs out of the executed). 
 89. Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally, and Iran, part of President Bush’s “axis of evil,” 
are examples of Islamic governments with the death penalty.  Amnesty 
International, at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng (last 
visited March 29, 2005).  Jordan, a U.S. ally, and Libya, a repentant U.S. foe, are 
examples of secular governments in the Muslim World with the death penalty.  Id. 
 90. See Kelley, supra note 82. 
 91. A political decision, per se, is not negative.  A political decision is negative 
to the extent that it does not contribute to good strategy. 
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outraged after the attacks on our soil.  For many, the spirit of the 
mob was stirred up; they wanted someone to pay for these horrors, 
and, in Old Testament tradition, they expected blood to be repaid 
with blood.  The families of the victims have been an effective lobby 
on the Government, pushing for inquiries into the intelligence 
failures and putting pressure on the Justice Department to exact 
the ultimate price from the “evildoers.”92  Attorney General 
Ashcroft, already a broad supporter of the death penalty, probably 
did not need any prodding.  As the nation’s symbolic executioner, 
he was pleased to fulfill these bloody demands.93 
In our politics, once a public official promises something, it is 
difficult for him to back off that promise.  The Justice Department 
seeks Moussaoui’s conviction and execution, and nothing less than 
that may satisfy many parts of a bloodthirsty American public.  The 
decision to seek the death penalty has come at a cost, not to the 
Attorney General, but to the line prosecutors that must deliver the 
conviction and the execution.  As the prosecutors know, the death 
penalty creates its own complications in a criminal case.  For this 
reason, after the Moussaoui case became eligible for the death 
penalty, another prosecutor, David Novak, was added to the 
government’s team because of his experience in navigating 
through the procedural obstacles.94  Without the death penalty, one 
fewer prosecutor would be needed at counsel’s table and many 
other problems would be avoided. 
Part of the reason that Judge Brinkema has been so broad in 
her definition of what must be turned over to Moussaoui in 
discovery is the looming threat of the death penalty over him.95  
 
 92. See David Firestone & James Risen, Threats and Responses: The Hearing; 
White House, In Shift, Backs Inquiry on 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at A1, 
available at 2002 WLNR 4068133; Christine Haughney, 9/11 Survivors Give Panel a 
Wish List; Review and Future Remedies Urged, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2003, at A10, 
available at 2003 WL 17424833; Tasha Robertson, OK for 9/11 Probe Followed 
Families’ Steadfast Lobbying, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 
WL 4151231; Pat Wingert, Bonds of Steel; Keeping Faith: The Families of 9/11 Victims 
are a Mighty Force. Ask the White House, the Commission – or Anyone Else in Their Way, 
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 2004, at 30, available at 2004 WLNR 3639708. 
 93. Attorney General Transcript, News Conference, DOJ to Seek Death Penalty 
Against Moussaoui (Mar. 28, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/ 
032802newsconferenceaginmiamifloridamoussaoui.htm. 
 94. This was made clear to me in conversations with both Rob Spencer and 
David Novak in 2004. 
 95. Mem. Op., United States v. Moussaui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed 
Mar. 10, 2003) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68354/1.pdf. 
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When death is a possibility, the stakes are higher, and the courts err 
on the side of disclosure.96  That is how it should be.  The Justice 
Department accepts this.  The American public should know this.  
If the death penalty is not part of the case, the Justice Department 
would be in a much better position to convince the courts that the 
government, for national security reasons, does not have to turn 
over classified discovery.  And even for the classified items that 
must be turned over, the Justice Department could make stronger 
arguments for broad redactions and general summaries. 
The United States is one of few developed countries that still 
uses the death penalty.97  Most of our allies in Europe have banned 
this penalty.98  In an international struggle against terrorism, the 
United States needs cooperation from all parts of the globe.  This 
cooperation takes the direct form of contributing troops to 
campaigns in Afghanistan but also takes the subtle form of passing 
on leads and intelligence from the law enforcement agencies and 
intelligence services.  For example, in investigating the September 
11 attacks, we asked for and received assistance from France, 
Germany, and Spain, countries that do not permit the death 
penalty.99  In their negotiations with the Justice Department, the 
French, German, and Spanish governments put conditions on the 
information they shared with us in the Moussaoui case once they 
learned that we were seeking his execution.100  Further, the French, 
German, and Spanish governments and other governments may 
self-filter, not even telling us about useful information they have in 
their files because of their opposition to our use of the death 
penalty.  These are not theoretical possibilities.  These are facts that 
contradict our counter-terrorism policies. 
A complication for this analysis is the possibility that our allies 
are posturing on the death penalty.  For their public, they may be 
 
 96. See id. 
 97. The Death Penalty Worldwide, at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/ 
A0777460.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).  Some other countries that still use the 
death penalty are Bahrain, Lebanon, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, 
putting us in strange company.  Id. 
 98. Id.  France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Spain have all outlawed 
the death penalty.  Id. 
 99. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 274 (French); see id. at 494–99 nn.64–
132 (German); see id. at 530 n.145 (Spanish). 
 100. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Twentieth Man: Has the Justice Department 
Mishandled the Case Against Zacarias Moussaoui?, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 30, 2002, at 
56; Michael Isikoff, et al., Should This Man Die?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 8, 2002, at 30, 
available at 2002 WLNR 8854294. 
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open about their opposition to the death penalty.  In their private 
meetings with U.S. authorities, say with a political officer in the 
U.S. embassy in Spain or with an FBI legal attaché in Paris, they 
may be very cooperative and less ideological about the death 
penalty.  For those without access to classified information and for 
those who once had security clearances but are not allowed to draw 
on their prior access because of continuing agreements on 
protecting classified information, the best we can do is guess what 
lies in the wilderness of mirrors.101  In crass and simple terms, is 
Franco-American cooperation on counter-terrorism at all affected 
by the possibility of Moussaoui’s execution?  Yes, I argue, to a 
limited extent.  But when France, a Western democracy, more 
secular than the United States, is in the same existential bind as us 
in a clash of civilizations with Islamic extremists, does the plight of 
one French citizen of Moroccan descent matter as much to the 
French Government as the two-way exchanges of information and 
personnel that are necessary to both American and French 
security?102  Effective intelligence services do not function in 
isolation.  Further, our allies’ opposition to our use of the death 
penalty may limit their extraditions of individuals to United States 
jurisdiction, but may not limit other forms of their cooperation.  
 
 101. Because of agreements I made upon entering the Central Intelligence 
Agency, I submitted this article for “pre-publication review” with so-called 
classification experts there.  Even so, the views in this article are mine, not theirs. 
 102. Although tempted, I am not saying that the French are more two-faced 
than Americans.  I do note that with a higher percentage of Muslims to their 
general population than the United States, the French seem more concerned 
about a Muslim backlash in their country.  Between 5 and 10% of the population 
in France is Muslim, compared to 1% in the United States.  CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/fields/2122.html (last updated Feb. 10, 2005).  In a move 
that many French citizens supported as a defense of the secular values of the 
French Republic, the French Government has prohibited the veil and other items 
of religious clothing in the public schools.  This led to demonstrations by Muslims 
in France and to angry statements from the Islamic Republic of Iran, among other 
governments in the Muslim World, and to further threats from Usama Bin Laden 
and other members of Al Qaeda.  Caroline Faraj, Bin Laden Deputy Slams Scarf Ban 
(Feb. 24, 2004), at http://cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/02/24/ 
qaeda.headscarves/; BBC News, Iran Urges French Scarf Rethink (Dec. 23, 2003), at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3343119.stm; Elaine 
Sciolino, French Muslims Protest Rule Against Scarves, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 
110, available at 2004 WLNR 5812462.  The ban has also been used as leverage by 
hostage takers in Iraq.  Two journalists held captive urged the French government 
to repeal the ban in exchange for their lives.  Elaine Sciolino, Hostages Urge France 
to Repeal its Scarf Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at A8, available at 2004 WLNR 
5532754. 
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This cooperation, in short, is not all or nothing.  Finally, it is useful 
to remember that we did not need French permission to arrest 
Moussaoui, and the French Government has not been too vocal in 
its demands that we return him to his French homeland so that 
French authorities can decide what to do with him.103 
The death penalty, whether sought in a federal district court 
or in a military tribunal, is counter-productive when the lost 
benefits of international cooperation outweigh any deterrence and 
retribution benefits from seeking the death penalty.104  That is 
clear.  Rather than play to public perceptions, good leaders would 
explain these realities to the American public and to the families 
who lost loved ones in the September 11 attacks. 
D. The Costs of Special Protection 
Wherever Moussaoui is housed, he should be isolated from Al 
Qaeda members, inside or outside the facility, to prevent his escape 
and to prevent the free flow of information to and from him.  
Therefore, another advantage of a military tribunal in Moussaoui’s 
case is that he can be more effectively isolated in a military facility 
than in criminal detention.  Military bases, more so than detention 
centers and prisons, are designed and managed to combat military 
threats.105  “Force protection,” in short, is more the military’s 
specialty than law enforcement’s.106 
 
 103. By contrast, some Governments have been very vocal about having their 
citizens released from Guantanamo Bay.  See Neil A. Lewis, Bowing to Ally, Bush to 
Rethink Tribunals for British Subjects, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2003, at A3, available at 2003 
WLNR 5663871 (discussing the reconsideration of cases involving Australian and 
British detainees); Associated Press, Saudis Seek Control of Saudi Detainees, Jan. 29, 
2002, at http://www.dailyherald.com/special/waronterrorism/ 
story.asp?intID=3728559 (discussing the urging by Saudi Arabia that Saudi 
detainees be turned over for questioning at home). 
 104. In my calculus, I assume that the philosophical arguments about the 
death penalty even themselves out so that the calculations can be limited to 
instrumental effects.  I do recognize the inherent limits to these data and 
calculations, such that I, too, am engaged in impressionism as much as science. 
 105. See Department of Defense Directive 2310.1, August 18, 1994, available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d23101_081894/d23101p.pdf 
(persons captured or detained by the U.S. Military “shall normally be handed over 
for safeguarding to the U.S. Army Police, or to detainee collecting points or other 
holding facilities operated by U.S. Military police”). 
 106. See Commander Gregory P. Noone, et al., Prisoners of War in the 21st 
Century: Issues in Modern Warfare, 50 NAV. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2004).  Under the 
Geneva Conventions, enemy prisoners must be removed from the battlefield as 
soon as possible and protected at all times from physical and mental harm.  Id.  
Further, enemy prisoners must be held in a place sufficiently outside the combat 
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At the Alexandria Detention Center, Moussaoui is subject to 
Special Administrative Measures (SAMS), which are authorized in 
the regulations of the Bureau of Prisons.107  These SAMS, which 
have also been placed on espionage defendants in the past, severely 
restrict Moussaoui’s interactions with other prisoners, with his 
defense counsel, and with the rest of the world.108  In effect, he lives 
in a bubble within a bubble.  The public is not able to determine 
the specific costs from these extra security measures, but it is safe to 
say that Moussaoui is costing the taxpayers far more than the 
typical criminal defendant who is housed in the general population 
of pre-trial detainees.  The restrictions on the flow of documents 
and visitors are designed, in part, to prevent Moussaoui from 
leaking any classified information to which he obtains access, 
properly or improperly, and to prevent messages from being passed 
to and from other members of his terrorist group.109 
Moussaoui’s isolation has taken a toll on him.110  He seems 
much thinner in court than in the photographs taken close to the 
time of his arrest.  Moussaoui’s isolation and his repeated 
statements that his court-appointed lawyers are part of the 
government plot against him have affected the quality of his 
defense.111  For a flavor of Moussaoui’s mental processes, we can 
 
zone of danger.  Id. 
 107. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (2005). 
 108. Id.  Special administrative measures may include, but are not limited to, 
limiting correspondence, visits, interviews with representatives of the news media, 
and use of the telephone.  Id. 
 109. Under the Bureau of Prisons procedures, the special administrative 
measures may be renewed annually.  28 C.F.R. § 501.3(c) (2005). 
 110. Earlier in the process, Judge Brinkema determined that Moussaoui was 
competent to face trial.  United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 
filed Dec. 11, 2001) (Criminal No. 01-183), at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/DocketSheet.html.  The 
standard for competency is low, mainly the ability to assist defense counsel, such 
that it is possible for Moussauoi to suffer from some mental illness while being 
competent.  See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (describing the 
test for competency as whether the defendant has “sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and 
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him”); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397–400 (1993) (holding 
that the standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is the same as 
the standard for competency to stand trial).  The definitions of mental illness that 
mental health experts use are quite broad.  See, e.g., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (4th ed., 
textual rev. 2000). 
 111. See Sam A. Schmidt & Joshua L. Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the 
Government’s Secrecy and Security Arsenal for the Benefit of the Client in Terrorism 
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consult the numerous filings he made while pro se.112  Many of 
these filings are handwritten, displaying Moussaoui’s bizarre sense 
of humor and a vitriol for almost everyone connected to the case, 
including Judge Brinkema, the prosecutors, and his defense 
lawyers.113  Isolation in a military facility, of course, would also take 
 
Prosecutions, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 69, 75 (2004).  Dratel represented one of the 
defendants in the trial in the Southern District of New York related to the 
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  Id. at 69.  As further 
proof of the limited circle of lawyers involved in national security cases, one of the 
embassy bombing prosecutors, Ken Karas, was added to the Moussaoui 
prosecution team soon after the indictment. 
 112. See Defendant's Motion, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 
(E.D. Va. filed Aug. 1, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/67010/0.pdf 
(Moussaoui titled the motion: “Motion for a 1st Class Ticket on 747-400 Out of the 
United States Now!”); Defendant’s Motion, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. 
Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed July 3, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66590/0.pdf 
(Moussaoui titled the motion: “Motion to Have Independent Electronic 
Surveillance Forensic Expert to Examine and Test a Square Fan ‘Mysteriously’ Left 
on My Car”); Defendant's Motion, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 
(E.D. Va. filed July 1, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66489/0.pdf 
(Moussaoui titled the motion: “Motion to Stop Leonie Brinkema DJ playing Game 
with My Life”).  The Government obtained the right to review these filings before 
they were made public to ensure that they did not contain secret messages to 
other members of Moussaoui’s terrorist network. 
 113. See Defendant's Motion, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 
(E.D. Va. filed July 10, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66741/1.pdf 
(Moussaoui titled the motion: “Motion to Stop the Cynical Comedy, Parody of 
Justice Directed by DJ Brinkema”).  “DJ” is Moussaoui’s abbreviation for “death 
judge,” a title he uses often to refer to Judge Brinkema.  Defendant’s Motion, 
United States v. Moussaui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. filed July 1, 2003) 
(Criminal No. 69065), http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts/1:01-cr-
00455/doca/69065/1.pdf.  For a sample attack on the prosecutors, see 
Defendant’s Motion, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 
filed July 11, 2003) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at  
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68933/1.pdf 
(Moussaoui titled the motion: “Motion to Emergency Strike by the Natural Born 
Terrorist, ZM, to Have a Dual [sic] Shoot Out with Chief Liar Ashcroft in Lieonie 
[sic] Court Yard.”).  And for an attack on Moussaoui’s own lawyers, see 
Defendant's Motion, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 
filed May 12, 2003) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), available at 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68749/1.pdf 
(Moussaoui titled the motion: “Motion to Counter Dirty Insider Dealing by Fat 
Megalo Dunham for his Chief Pay Persecution Master Ashcroft (a/k/a United 
Satan Chief Liar) and To Have Fat Megalo Out of 9/11 Circus Trial”).  Dunham is 
chief defense attorney Frank Dunham, who Moussaoui repeatedly refers to as 
either “fat” or “blood sucker.”  United States v. Moussaui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 
(E.D. Va. filed Aug. 7, 2003) (Criminal No. 68876), 
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a toll on Moussaoui.  The toll on the taxpayer, however, may not be 
as severe. 
E. Taking Away the Soapbox 
Another reason to choose a military tribunal over a federal 
district court is to deprive Moussaoui, as much as constitutional, of 
a platform for his propaganda.  The conflict against Al Qaeda is as 
much a battle of ideas as a battle of arms.  A military tribunal, with 
strict limits on public access, would put an appropriate muzzle on 
Moussaoui without taking away his rights to fair process.  
Otherwise, even without cameras in the courtroom, a trial in 
federal district court with film crews on the steps of the courthouse 
and reporters inside would create a media frenzy in which 
Moussaoui’s words of defiance would be replayed and distorted all 
over the world.  This is a soapbox that should be taken away. 
F.  Material Witness Statute 
Another problem with treating Moussaoui as a law 
enforcement problem rather a military problem114 was that it 
placed stress on the tools of criminal law.  Square pegs were 
pounded into round holes.  If Moussaoui had been promptly 
transferred to military custody, it would not have been necessary to 
test—some would argue abuse—the use of a material witness 
warrant in his case.  The material witness problem, of course, was 
resolved once Moussaoui was indicted on criminal changes. 
In the early days after September 11, the Bush Administration 
had not tested the full contours of the material witness statute for 
detaining individuals.  Since Moussaoui’s arrest, it has become 
clear that an individual can be detained while a grand jury 
investigation is pending.115  Based on the witness’s possible 
 
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts/1:01-cr-00455/doca/68876/1.pdf.  All of the 
above documents are available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-
00455/DocketSheet.html.  Moussaoui’s court pleadings were so insulting and 
inflammatory that at one point, Judge Brinkema ordered them sealed, only to 
remove the ban thirteen days later.  Associated Press, Moussaoui Judge Bars Release of 
Insults (Sept. 6, 2002), at http://courttv.com/trials/moussaoui/090602_ap.html. 
 114. See discussion supra Part II. 
 115. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 49–51 (2d Cir. 2003).  The 
requirement of promptly taking the witness’s deposition so he can be released 
from custody can also be avoided.  See id. at 62 (concluding that the deposition 
mechanism is not automatically available for grand jury witnesses detained under 
section 3144, and that post-deposition release of witnesses is subject to the court’s 
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connection to a crime or possible assistance in solving a crime, a 
witness can be detained even if the government does not have 
probable cause—or any evidence—that the witness, himself or 
herself, has committed a crime.116  It is in this way, as many 
commentators have noted, that the presumption of innocence and 
other constitutional rights have been turned on their heads.117 
Material witnesses are mainly at the mercy of prosecutors who 
are trusted to not abuse their discretion.  In short, the criminal 
system expects a prosecutor to issue subpoenas on the basis of good 
faith instead of pretexts.  With the secrecy that cloaks grand jury 
proceedings, and with judges that are reluctant to probe behind 
the reasons for grand jury subpoenas, these expectations are based 
more on faith than on facts.  After all, prosecutors can fall into the 
possessive and incorrect snare of regarding subpoenas as their own, 
rather than the grand jury’s.118  Be that as it may, if the checks on 
investigative abuses are to be effective, they should focus on the 
 
discretion). 
 116. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2004).  The standard is whether “the testimony of a 
person is material in a criminal proceeding.”  Id. 
 117. Much has been written recently about the alleged abuses of this statute to 
detain terrorism suspects.  See, e.g., David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The 
Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1778 (2004) (asserting that 
the material witness statute circumvents restrictions—such as judicial review—
prescribed in section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act); Quinn H. Vandenberg, How 
can the United States Rectify Its Post-9/11 Stance on Noncitizens’ Rights?, 18 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 605, 623–25 (2004) (arguing that the material witness 
statute is abusive because it is vague and neither limits how long a witness can be 
detained nor dictates whether the government can compel the witness’s 
testimony).  In my experience as a federal prosecutor in the Southern District of 
California, a core use of this statute was to detain illegal aliens so they could testify 
against the traffickers that brought them from Mexico into the United States.  
Without their testimony, the cases against the “coyotes” were weaker.  These illegal 
aliens did not need to be detained too long.  With the agreement of defense 
counsel, their testimony could be preserved for trial through a deposition under 
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and they could then be 
returned to Mexico.  On the other hand, many of those who have been held on 
material witness warrants in terrorism investigations have been held for months, if 
not years.  See Steve Fainaru, Suspect Held 8 Months Without Seeing Judge, WASH. POST, 
June 12, 2002, at A1 (reporting that a Boston cab driver was held in solitary 
confinement for more than eight months without seeing a judge or receiving 
assistance of counsel), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId= A34822-2002Jun11&notFound=true; 
Adam Liptak, Threats and Responses: The Detainees; For Post-9/11 Material Witness, It Is 
a Terror of a Different Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WLNR 
5371092 (describing how a material witness was arrested and held for sixteen 
months without being charged for a crime or even asked to testify). 
 118. I know this from first hand experience. 
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prosecutor’s practices rather than the grand jury’s. 
IV. THE POLITICS OF MOUSSAOUI 
It is easy to wonder why, in the face of all these problems and 
complications, the Moussaoui case remains in federal district court.  
The reason Moussaoui is still in the criminal system is more about 
inertia than strategy.  During the dangerous and uncertain days 
after September 11, our officials could be forgiven for not being 
able to think through all the implications of our counter-terrorism 
policies.  They were reacting to horrible events.  More than three 
years later, the public should be less forgiving with any 
Administration that still bumbles about in the dark for a cohesive 
strategy.119  Bush officials may defend themselves, in a classified 
cloak, by saying that they are keeping our enemies guessing.  But it 
is neither convincing nor right for them to keep most of the 
American people guessing.  The American public and our allies 
need to be on board in a struggle that may last as long as the Cold 
War.  Part of getting them on board is being precise about the 
objectives and the means for attaining them.  Part of it is being 
specific in measuring our progress. 
In one area of confusion, it is not clear what principles led to 
placing Jose Padilla in a military brig as opposed to placing John 
Walker Lindh before a federal court.  Both are U.S. citizens.  
Walker Lindh, the so-called “American Taliban,” was captured on a 
battlefield in Afghanistan.120  Padilla, whom the Bush 
Administration designated as the “dirty bomber,”121 was captured at 
Chicago’s O’Hare airport.122  Did it make a difference that Padilla is 
a Latino from mean streets, while Walker Lindh is a privileged 
Caucasian from Marin County?  Let’s hope not.  Why are some of 
Moussaoui’s cohorts in Guantanamo and secret locations while he 
continues to reside at a federal detention center, part of the 
criminal system, in Virginia?  The time has come for answers.  If 
there are no answers, the time has come to admit the mistakes, to 
rectify them, and to move on. 
 
 119. This is not the place to replay the criticism of the Bush invasion of Iraq as 
a diversion from the overall goal of eradicating terrorists.  My criticism goes far 
beyond that conflict. 
 120. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 568–69 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 121. See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 572–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 122. See Jared A. Simmons, Note, In Civilian Dress & With Hostile Purpose, 37 
IND. L. REV. 579, 580 (2004). 
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The Justice Department, for its part, probably wants to show 
that it can finish what it started, that we can still prosecute terrorists 
the old-fashioned way.  And in a logic that only makes sense in 
Washington, D.C.—because the Defense Department may still be 
pushing for Moussaoui’s transfer to military custody—the Justice 
Department may be reacting with the same force against a sister 
agency.123  Rather than “lose” to the Defense Department, the 
Justice Department insists on the status quo. 
The Justice Department is now headed by a new Attorney 
General with less of a stake in the Moussaoui case.124  Accordingly, 
the Bush Administration has another opportunity to do something 
that makes sense.125  Even the chief of the Justice Department’s 
Criminal Division when Moussaoui was indicted, Michael Chertoff, 
has expressed some doubts about the wisdom of our policies.  
When Chertoff, now the head of Homeland Security, was on the 
bench in the Third Circuit, he floated the idea of enacting a special 
statute, along the lines of British anti-terrorism laws, to authorize 
the limited detention and interrogation of terrorism suspects.126 
 
 123. See Dan Eggen, FBI Chief Says Tribunal May Try 9/11 Suspects, Jan. 15, 2004, 
WASH. POST, at A1; Editorial, Missing Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A14 
(noting that the Bush administration has threatened to try Moussaoui before a 
military tribunal); Philip Shenon, White House Called Target of Plane Plot, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 8, 2003, at A7 (reporting that Moussaoui would be tried before a military 
tribunal if civilian courts ordered the government to grant Moussaoui access to 
detainees). 
 124. Charles Hurt, Gonzales Confirmed Attorney General, WASH. TIMES. (Feb. 4, 
2003), available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050204-123544-
7508r.htm. 
 125. I am a close friend of Robert Spencer, the lead Moussaoui prosecutor.  
Although I have not discussed the proposal of this article with him, I doubt that it 
will come as a surprise to him.  Outside the moment, we all may agree that our 
counter-terrorism policy is far more important than the rewards, 
accomplishments, or satisfactions of any official involved in a particular case. 
 126. See Michael Chertoff, Law, Loyalty, & Terror: Our Legal Response to the Post-
9/11 World, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Dec. 1, 2003), available at 
https://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=3419&B
=C3BB2 (asserting that “[w]e need  to debate a long-term and sustainable 
architecture for the process of determining when, why, and for how long someone 
may be detained as an enemy combatant, and what judicial review should be 
available”).  In a forthcoming article, I explore in more detail whether it is 
possible to pass a sensible and constitutional statute that would allow a prolonged 
detention, measured in months rather than days, of terrorism suspects for 
interrogation for intelligence purposes.  This statute at a minimum would create a 
special detention court, parallel to the FISA court, to review applications from the 
Executive Branch for such detentions. 
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V. THE SPECIFICS OF A MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
There are two components to the military proceedings for 
Guantanamo detainees, all of whom are said to be other than U.S. 
citizens.  First, all detainees are to appear before the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) to determine whether or not they 
are enemy combatants.127  Here, the status must be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence to three commissioned military 
officers.128  Under the CSRT, the rules of evidence are relaxed and 
a non-lawyer represents the detainee.129  Once the government 
makes this showing, it may confine the detainees for the duration 
of the combat, namely the confrontation with Al Qaeda, provided 
they still pose a threat.130  Second, if the government would like to 
confine the detainee beyond the duration of the conflict, it may do 
so through the military commissions that the President has 
established.131  Here, with a higher burden, the government must 
show beyond a reasonable doubt to a tribunal of anywhere from 
three to seven military officers that the detainee has violated the 
laws of war.132  A two-thirds vote is sufficient for a verdict, and either 
military or civilian counsel may represent the detainee.133  The 
hearsay rules are relaxed so that any evidence that has “probative 
value to a reasonable person” may be admitted.134  In Moussaoui’s 
case, this article assumes that the government could meet the 
burden of either the CSRT or the military commission, but the 
 
 127. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the 
Secretary of the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
 128. Memorandum from Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy (July 29, 
2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/ 
d20040730comb.pdf. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Memorandum from Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy (Sept. 14, 
2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/ 
d20040914adminreview.pdf (establishing the annual Administrative Review 
Procedures for enemy combatants).  As of March 1, 2005, the U.S. Military has 
held 558 CSRT hearings.  Defense Department, Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
Summary, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/Mar2005/d20050301csrt.pdf (last visited April 15, 2005). 
 131. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 132. Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, §§ 4(A)(2)–
(3), 6(F) (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ 
Mar2002/ d20020321ord.pdf. 
 133. Id. at 4(C) and 6(F). 
 134. Id. at 6(D)(1). 
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focus is on the military commission. 
This article is not intended as a specific analysis of all the 
procedures of the Bush Administration’s military commission.  In 
arguing that Moussaoui should be transferred to military custody, 
this article can accept the basics of what the Bush Administration 
has proposed for military commissions.  Going a bit further, it 
seems clear that the procedures need not be as stingy as those that 
the Bush Administration has proposed.  For example, contrary to 
the Bush Administration order, a unanimous verdict could be 
called for out of fairness to the accused and out of a concern for 
the credibility of the military proceedings to our public and to the 
international community.135  The great advantages of a military 
tribunal for the Moussaoui case are that the use of military 
personnel increases the chances that the fact-finders can obtain 
security clearances to hear any classified information necessary to 
the case and that much of the trial could be closed to the public.136 
To repeat, the criminal law paradigm in dealing with non-
citizens who are parts of plots or organizations intent on killing 
U.S. citizens and destroying U.S. property does not strike the 
proper balance between the government’s legitimate interest in 
protecting the secrecy and efficacy of counter-terrorism operations 
and the defendant’s right to a fair trial.137  The non-U.S. citizen 
such as Moussaoui who avoided wearing a military uniform so he 
could blend into American society to kill American citizens, 
whether as part of the September 11 plot or some other plot, 
whether the intended victims were on U.S. soil or elsewhere, is a 
direct descendent of the Ex Parte Quirin138 defendants, who were 
appropriately treated in a military tribunal. 
 
 135. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57835 (requiring only a two-thirds majority to 
convict an enemy combatant). 
 136. See  Military Commission Order No. 1 at § 4(C)(3) (stating that the 
accused may hire civilian counsel if it is  determined the attorney is eligible to 
access “SECRET” level classified information); id. at § 6(B)(3) (stating that the 
proceedings should be open “the maximum extent possible,” but some 
proceedings may be closed to protect classified information, including prospective 
witnesses; intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities; and 
other national security interests). 
 137. One of the government interests is the interrogation for intelligence 
purposes of high-value detainees, some of whom Moussaoui would like to access.  
An obvious method of disrupting terrorist plots is to know about them in their 
planning stage before they are implemented. 
 138. 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942). 
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Some reasonable arguments have been made for hesitating, 
for not taking the government on faith, before resorting to military 
tribunals.139  Regardless, the Government’s allegations in the 
Moussaoui indictment, contrary to what Professor Margulies 
implies, do constitute more than the Executive branch’s “mere 
assertion of exigency.”140  Instead, the detail to the Moussaoui 
indictment lays out a prima facie case that Moussaoui has violated 
the laws of war.141 
The Government is not under the same discovery obligations 
in a military tribunal as it is in a federal district court.  This is one 
lesson of Quirin where fewer constitutional safeguards were 
required for military tribunals.142  Further, despite the voices of 
dissent, there is ample scholarly support for trying individuals who 
have violated the laws of war in military tribunals.143  The Executive 
Branch now has the discretion, even if it lacks the wisdom, to do 
what is proposed in this article.  If the Bush Administration is 
serious when it states that we are engaged in a war on terrorism, it 
logically follows that captured enemies should be dealt with as 
combatants rather than criminal defendants.  Finally, no further 
Congressional authorization is necessary to transfer Moussaoui 
from federal district court to a military tribunal. 
There are at least four reasons why the President does not 
need any further Congressional authorization to transfer 
Moussaoui to a military tribunal.  First, the President has ample 
powers as the Commander in Chief of the military. 144  Second, 
 
 139. See Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, 
Institutional Equity, and Procedure after September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383 (2004).  For 
a harsher attack on military tribunals, see Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, 
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002). 
 140. See Margulies, supra note 139 at 440. 
 141. Second Superceding Indictment, Count Four, United States v. Moussaoui, 
282 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. entered Jul. 16, 2002) (Criminal No. 01-455-A), 
available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66826/ 
0.pdf.   
[D]efendant . . . unlawfully, willfully and knowingly combined, 
conspired, confederated and agreed to use weapons of mass 
destruction, namely, airplanes intended for use as missiles, bombs, and 
similar devices, and other weapons of mass destruction, without lawful 
authority against persons within the United States . . . with the result 
that thousands of people died on September 11, 2001. 
Id. 
 142. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39–41. 
 143. See Margulies, supra note 139, at 437 n.263. 
 144. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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Congress has established a system of military justice and granted 
the Executive Branch the authority to make rules in this field.145  
This provides general support for treating some individuals outside 
the criminal system.  Third, a week after the September 11 attacks, 
Congress authorized the President to “use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons” 
behind the September 11 attacks.146  This provides specific support.  
Fourth, the “4001(a) statute” that provides that “no citizen shall be 
. . . detained . . . by the United States except pursuant to an Act of 
Congress” does not require express authorization to detain illegal 
combatants.147  On this last point, Professor Margulies’s analysis is 
sound that this statute does not preclude implied authorizations for 
detentions, that this statute is more backward-looking to prevent 
internments along the lines of the American concentration camps 
during World War II.148  Professor Margulies seems off the mark, 
however, to the extent he seems to suggest that the implied 
authorization can only reach attacks on U.S. citizens and U.S. 
property within the United States.  The Authorization for Use of 
Military Force, after all, speaks of preventing “any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States.”  This addresses 
an attack on our nation.  Accordingly, a broad and—arguably—
more correct reading of this Authorization covers illegal 
combatants that attack U.S. citizens and U.S. property anywhere in 
the world. 
Hardly anyone can doubt that our counter-terrorism efforts 
are global; it follows that in a global war we may find and capture 
illegal combatants inside and outside the United States.  Indeed, as 
much as the academy, the human rights organizations, and the self-
elected defenders of civil liberties try to maintain clear distinctions 
between the domestic and international realms, the doctrinal lines 
blur and break down in such a war.  Our strategy and our law 
should be nimble enough to keep up with the changes in the 
battlefield.  To preserve our values and to prevail, our strategy for 
the battle must incorporate healthy doses of idealism and realism.  
A single dose of either will not do.  Just so, this proposal, eschewing 
the intellectual clarity of any pole, is one attempt at blending these 
 
 145. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–940 (2005). 
 146. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 
(codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (West 2004)). 
 147. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2004). 
 148. Margulies, supra note 139, at 423. 
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doses to find the right balance for difficult times. 
As another balance, some commentators, while not completely 
opposed to detaining illegal combatants, have suggested placing 
time limits on these detentions.149  The flaw with their suggestion is 
that it goes counter to the principles of an effective interrogation.  
The terrorist organizations will train their operatives—and the 
operatives will be motivated—to withstand the interrogation until 
the time of the publicized limit.  Effective interrogation, by 
contrast, depends on the isolation and the uncertainty of the 
detainee.150 
A general critique of time limits, of course, does not preclude 
us from secretly putting specific limits in place before a special 
court, cleared for classified information.  To be sure, in no event 
should an endless detention of an illegal combatant be tolerated.  
Up front a choice should be made: The combatant should be 
interrogated, tried in a military tribunal, released to another 
authority, or freed.  One option, say interrogation, does not 
necessarily preclude another option, say trial in a military tribunal, 
but in no event should a combatant languish outside of a legal 
category.  In Moussaoui’s case, although much of his information 
has gotten cold, this mystery man still must have useful information 
and corroboration for U.S. interrogators.  Therefore, implicit to 
the proposal that he be transferred outside the criminal system is 
the notion that all the other options, interrogation, trial, or release, 
should be available.  Back in the criminal system the only option 
that seems to have been pursued is the circus. 
VI. MOUSSAOUI IN LIGHT OF RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
As important as choosing the correct location for Moussaoui’s 
detention is choosing the correct basis for detaining him.  Even if 
Moussaoui has access to the courts through the writ of habeas 
corpus, the Executive Branch should be able to conform with some 
 
 149. See id. at 414. 
 150. See Declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby (Jan. 9, 2003), available 
at http://www.cnss.org/Jacoby_Declaration.pdf. 
Permitting Padilla any access to counsel may substantially harm our 
national security interests . . . . Only after such time as Padilla has 
perceived that help is not on the way can the United States reasonably 
expect to obtain all possible intelligence from Padilla . . . . Providing him 
access to counsel . . . would break—probably irreparably—the sense of 
dependency and trust that the interrogators are attempting to create. 
Id. 
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minimal process, perhaps by ex parte, in camera filings, that 
demonstrates to a court or some other body the probable cause 
that Moussaoui is a terrorist.151  Therefore, his military detention 
can be justified under the rule of law. 
The following discussion illustrates that the Supreme Court’s 
recent decisions may already provide sufficient authority to detain 
Moussaoui in a military facility and to interrogate him for an 
extended period of time.  Moussaoui was a non-U.S. citizen, 
detained in the United States, and part of conspiracy to kill 
Americans in the United States and outside the United States.  
Although the Supreme Court denied the Bush Administration’s 
argument that detainees at Guantanamo Bay do not have any right 
to American courts, the Court did not challenge the Bush 
Administration’s position that, once a non-U.S. citizen’s status as an 
illegal enemy combatant has been demonstrated, he may be held 
outside the criminal system.152 
One question is whether Moussaoui needs to be treated any 
differently from the detainees in Guantanamo.  Because the Bush 
Administration has not disclosed many details about individual 
detainees at Guantanamo, it is difficult to make specific 
comparisons to Moussaoui.153  The majority of the Guantanamo 
detainees seemed to have been captured by the United States, by 
Northern Alliance allies, or by intermediaries during the successful 
military operation against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.154  Accordingly, Moussaoui differs from the typical 
 
 151. For this purpose, the definition of terrorist from the United States 
Criminal Code could be copied or adapted.  The water here, however, is quite 
murky. There is widespread confusion on the precise definition of terrorism.  
Numerous federal statutes define the term, each with a somewhat different 
conclusion on what constitutes an act of terrorism. See 6 U.S.C. § 101(15) (2005); 
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2005) (differentiating “international terrorism” from “domestic 
terrorism”); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2005) (listing no fewer than thirty statute 
sections that can be violated for a crime to be considered a “federal crime of 
terrorism”). 
 152. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 
2686 (2004). 
 153. See Press Release, White House Press Secretary, Status of Detainees at 
Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2002/02/ 20020207-13.html; News Transcript, Department of 
Defense, Briefing on Detainee Operations at Guantanamo Bay (Feb. 13, 2004), available 
at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040213-0443.html; 
Department of Defense, Guantanamo Detainees (Mar. 16, 2004), at 
http://www.usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2004/Mar/17-718401.html. 
 154. The United States Government has acknowledged approximately 640 
detainees in Guatanamo.  Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (2004).  Some more 
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detainee in Guantanamo in at least two ways.  First, he was arrested 
in the United States, not overseas.  Second, he was arrested before 
September 11 and before Congress passed the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force.155  Whether these factual differences have 
legal significance is another matter.  The threat Moussaoui posed 
to the United States was as great, if not greater, than that of many 
Guantanamo detainees who played logistical but not operational 
roles for Al Qaeda and the Taliban.  Further, because the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force was tied to the September 
11 attacks, that Authorization should have an obvious retroactive 
effect on individuals who were part of the September 11 plot.156 
In relation to earlier Supreme Court precedent, Moussaoui 
should be in no better legal position than German saboteurs who, 
along with a German-American citizen, were convicted in a military 
tribunal and sentenced to death during World War II.157  Like 
Moussaoui, these Germans came to the United States on a mission 
of sabotage.158  Like Moussaoui, these Germans wore civilian dress, 
having buried their uniforms once they landed on American 
beaches.159  Unlike Moussaoui, these Germans were soldiers in a 
situation where there had been a mutual declaration of war.160  As 
to Moussaoui’s organization, Al Qaeda, it took a “second” Pearl 
Harbor before we reciprocated their declaration of war.161 
 
recent detainees may have come from the Iraqi conflict.  See Dana Priest, Memo Lets 
CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at A01. 
 155. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 156. Id. 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons. 
Id. 
 157. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942); see also Juliet Stumpf, Citizens of an 
Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the Constitutional Rights of the Pseudo-
Citizen, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (2004); Carl Tobias, Punishment and the War on 
Terrorism, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1116 (2004); A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, 
Quirin Revisited, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 309 (2003). 
 158. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001).  For anyone who would listen, Usama Bin Laden issued his declaration 
in a fatwa delivered in August 1996. 
My Muslim Brothers of the World: Your brothers in Palestine and in the 
land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to 
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Moussaoui should be in no better legal position than Yaser 
Esam Hamdi, arrested in Afghanistan, held in Guantanamo, and 
then transferred to a military brig once American authorities 
confirmed that he was a dual Saudi-American citizen.162  Unlike 
Hamdi, however, Moussaoui was not caught “carrying a weapon 
against American troops on a foreign battlefield.”163  In a sense, if 
the government’s allegations are true, Moussaoui himself could be 
viewed as a weapon of destruction on American soil.  Hamdi was 
detained and interrogated for over two years, most of it without 
access to defense counsel.164  When Hamdi’s case arrived at the 
Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor wrote a plurality opinion that 
stated, based on the Authorization for Use of Military Force, that 
even an American citizen could be held outside the criminal system 
on a showing that he was an illegal enemy combatant.165  In Justice 
O’Connor’s view, Hamdi was entitled to some legal process to 
confirm his status, but not to the full-blown protections of an 
Article III court.166  Further, Justice O’Connor indicated that once 
the Government has given Hamdi a modicum of due process, he 
could be held away from the “battlefield” for the duration of the 
hostilities.167  What is not clear from the opinion is whether the 
Government has a separate right to interrogate the illegal enemy 
combatant.  Justice O’Connor states that interrogation is not one of 
the Government’s interests.168  But this statement may be limited to 
Hamdi’s facts.  In other words, the Supreme Court may accept a 
different Congressional authorization that is more specific 
 
take part in fighting against the enemy—your enemy and their enemy—
the Americans and the Israelis.  They are asking you to do whatever you 
can, with one own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and 
defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam. 
PBS, Bin Laden’s Fatwa, available at  http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/ 
international/fatwa_1996.html. For those who believe actions are more important 
than words, Al Qaeda made its intentions clear in the first bombing of the World 
Trade Center, the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 
attack on the U.S.S. Cole. 
 162. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct 2633, 2636 (2004). 
 163. Id. at 2642 n.1. 
 164. Id. at 2636. 
 165. Id. at 2640 (“There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own 
citizens as an enemy combatant.”). 
 166. Id. at 2648–51. 
 167. Id. at 2640. 
 168. Id. at 2651 (“Hamdi contends that the AUMF does not authorize 
indefinite or perpetual detention.  Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention 
for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized.”). 
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concerning interrogation for intelligence purposes.  As usual, the 
Supreme Court left the task of sorting out the details to the lower 
courts.  Before this could be done on the Hamdi case, rather than 
test the limits on detentions of American citizens as illegal enemy 
combatants, the Bush Administration negotiated a deal with 
Hamdi.169  In exchange for Hamdi renouncing his American 
citizenship, the Bush Administration released him to Saudi Arabia 
where he had spent most of his life after being born in Texas.170  
The irony to this case is that this illegal enemy combatant seems to 
have fared better than a comparable criminal defendant, U.S. 
citizen John Walker Lindh, also arrested in Afghanistan, who struck 
a twenty-year deal in the Eastern District of Virginia.171 
Now it is left to the Padilla case, reversed and remanded 
because of a procedural error under habeas corpus, to test the 
limits on detention of U.S. citizens.172  The lessons of Padilla may or 
may not apply to Moussaoui.  Padilla is said to have made contacts 
with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but was arrested in the 
United States.173  As happened with Hamdi, however, the Bush 
Administration may reach a deal with Padilla before the courts are 
given a full opportunity to sort out the case.  The district court in 
the Padilla case, on remand, has ruled that the Bush 
Administration did not have the authority to detain Padilla as an 
enemy combatant.174  The court distinguished Hamdi because 
Padilla was unarmed when he was arrested in the United States.175  
And, to distinguish Quirin,176 the court stated that Congress had not 
 
 169. Press Release, Department of Justice, U.S. Releases Enemy Combatant to 
Return to Saudi Arabia (Sept. 22, 2004), available at 
http://www.usinfo.state.gov/dhr/ Archive/2004/Sep/23-993718.html. 
 170. Id.; Richard Willing, U.S. to Send Detainee Back to Saudi Arabia Without 
Charges, USA TODAY, Sept. 22, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/nes/ 
washington/2004-09-22-us-hamdi_x.htm. 
 171. Plea Agreement, United States v. Lindh, Criminal No. 02-37A (E.D. Va. 
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/pleaagreement.htm.  John Walker 
Lindh’s request to the Justice Department that his sentence be shortened in light 
of Hamdi’s release was denied. This disparate treatment between Lindh and 
Hamdi should be a warning to the self-designated protectors of civil liberties who 
seem to always support the criminal process over other venues.  In short, be 
careful what you ask for.  See CNN, “I Plead Guilty,” Taliban American Says, (Jul. 17, 
2002), at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW07/15/walker.lindh.hearing. 
 172. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2727 (2004). 
 173. Id. at 2715, 2715 n.2. 
 174. Padilla v. Hanft, Civil Action No. 2:04-2221-26AJ, slip op. at 10 (D.S.C. 
Feb. 28, 2005). 
 175. Id. at 6. 
 176. Id. 
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specifically authorized Padilla’s detention.  But this is not 
necessarily the last word; the Justice Department has filed its notice 
of appeal.177 
As to non-U.S. citizens, the Guantanamo cases are working 
their way back through the courts.  Now that the Supreme Court 
has ruled that the Guantanamo detainees are entitled to relief in 
U.S. courts through habeas corpus petitions, the lower courts are 
testing how much process they must be given in determining their 
status as enemy combatants.  These determinations are separate 
from trials in the military tribunals. 
Since Justice Department prosecutors have proven the 
probable cause of their charges against Moussaoui through the 
presentation of an indictment to a grand jury, since they have 
appeared many times to defend their case before Judge Brinkema, 
meeting the standards of a “combatant status review” would be a 
formality for the Government in the Moussaoui case.  Indeed, if the 
Bush Administration had been wiser in its strategy it would have 
fully tested its counter-terrorism strategy on non-U.S. citizens, such 
as Moussaoui and the Guantanamo detainees, before considering 
these policies on U.S. citizens such as Hamdi and Padilla.178 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Zacarias Moussaoui should have been dealt with as we are 
dealing with Khaled Sheik Mohammed and other members of the 
Al Qaeda terrorist network: through non-criminal detention.  This 
stands true even if Moussaoui pleads guilty or is convicted in 
federal court.  Al Qaeda is more a military or an intelligence agency 
problem than a law enforcement problem.  Placing him in a 
federal district court for a criminal trial was a mistake.  Continuing 
the criminal process after evidence, including an in-court 
confession, confirmed that he was a member of Al Qaeda, was a 
 
 177. Notice of Appeal (Mar. 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/Padilla/Images/00000050.pdf.  
 178. Professor David Cole, who gives much less leeway to the Executive Branch 
than I, suggests that this testing on non-U.S. citizens and resident legal aliens is a 
precursor for restrictions on the rights of U.S. citizens.  See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy 
Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002).  For this reason, he argues that we must be 
vigilant in protecting the “other” because the other could soon become us.  
Solidarity is in our self-interest.  Therefore, while Professor Cole and I probably do 
not agree on the correct balance between individual liberty and group safety in 
national security cases, I hope that we agree it was a mistake to test the limits of 
our Constitution on U.S. citizens before we tested the limits on foreign citizens. 
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bigger mistake.  Further continuing the criminal process, despite 
all the costs and complications, despite the risks to intelligence 
sources and methods, despite the bad precedent it sets, would be 
an even bigger mistake.  The time has come.  A military tribunal for 
Moussaoui is better late than never. 
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